Introduction
America is in the midst of a civil war in which the demographic forces of an aging population are pitted against a labor force composed of a declining number of older workers. Today one in nine Americans is age 65 or older and in 50 years that proportion will change to one in five. Along with the growth in the aging population comes, of course, an increased burden on those who are working. Unfortunately, the conflict arises because fewer and fewer of the burgeoning older population are remaining in the labor force to con tribute to their own and to the larger society's well-being.
The factors contributing to the demographic trends lower fertility and mortality are largely beyond the control of public policy. But, the declining labor force rates of the elderly are in large part a direct result of public policies that have long encouraged early retirement and allowed (even created) obstacles to continued employment. In addition, eight major recessions or depressions since 1948 have wracked the economy, resulting in a dramatic decline in labor force participation rates among older workers.
One reason for the labor force declines among the older population is age discrimination, which creates greater dif ficulties for older workers as they seek and attempt to retain jobs. Many give up their job search after months of unemployment and then simply drop out of the labor force. They become discouraged because of employment obstacles created by persistent negative attitudes among employees that older workers are less desirable, less productive, and less creative than younger workers.
The challenge for policymakers is to find ways of stem ming the labor force exit of older workers. One option is to eradicate the age discrimination that older workers face. This paper examines the extent and nature of age discrimina tion and concludes with a review of recent legislative at tempts to strengthen the federal statute barring age discrimination in employment.
I. The Extent of Age Discrimination
Age discrimination in employment is widespread. There is no agreement on the exact nature of the problem nor is there a consensus on how to solve it. But few would disagree that the problem is real and that it affects the lives of millions of Americans.
Perceptions of the Problem
Public attitudes. Despite federal legislation to ban age discrimination from the workplace, most Americans believe age discrimination remains a serious problem. Two nation wide surveys by Louis Harris and Associates one in 1974, the other in 1981 found nearly identical results: eight of ten Americans believe that "most employers discriminate against older people and make it difficult for them to find work. " 1 The public is also in agreement that age discrimination should not be tolerated. When asked by Louis Harris in 1981 if age discrimination in the form of forced retirement is justified, nine out of ten Americans said no. 2 Moreover, be tween 1974 and 1981 the sentiment against forced retirement based on age grew stronger. 3
Employer attitudes. The perception of widespread age discrimination held by the public is shared by a majority of business leaders. Most employers believe age discrimination exists, according to a 1981 survey of 552 employers nation wide conducted by William M. Mercer, Inc. 4 The following key points summarize the survey's findings: 61 percent of employers believe older workers today are discriminated against in the employment marketplace; 22 percent claim it is unlikely that, without the pres ent legal constraints, the company would hire some one over age 50 for a position other than senior management; 20 percent admit that older workers (other than senior executives) have less of an opportunity for promo tions or training; and 12 percent admit that older workers' pay raises are not as large as those of younger workers in the same category.
Historical Perspective
A glance into history reveals that age discrimination has existed for a long time. According to historian William Graebner, age discrimination dates back to the last quarter of the 18th century and is a direct product of the industrial revolution. 5 Industrialization brought with it increased market competition, advanced technology and demands for greater speed on the job. These forces, in combination with the increasing popularity of the shorter workday, placed a greater strain on the older worker to keep up. Older workers also had difficulty keeping abreast of the new and changing technologies. The real culprit, though, was the theory of scientific management which dominated American business shortly after the turn of the century. Scientific management 162 demanded efficiency and flexibility, both qualities that were considered lacking in the older worker. The result was a direct form of age discrimination that simply wore older workers down and pushed them out of the workforce.
After 1915, age discrimination, which prior to this had been limited to a "management strategy," began to diffuse into the larger society. The "youth cult" of the 1920s and the high unemployment of the depression era turned older workers into a convenient scapegoat. Societal and employer attitudes after 1915 characterized the older worker as dispen sable in favor of younger workers, and the myth that pro ductivity automatically declines with age gained a solid foothold in American culture. In terms of ability, older and younger workers were perceived to be substantially alike by employers, at least according to a 1938 survey of the Na tional Association of Manufacturers. 6 Nonetheless, a clear preference persisted for the younger worker.
There was one mediating factor in the bias against older workers. Many employers perceived the older worker, with all of his inefficiencies, to be a stable influence on the com paratively younger, more hot-headed workforce. The trade union movement was a source of great concern to most employers during the 1930s, and older workers were seen as a conservative force which could help check the excesses of the fledgling union movement. According to Graebner, "Ex cessive radicalism, associated in the public mind with youth and immaturity, could be countered with age." 7 Despite this new "attractiveness" of the older workers, age discrimina tion did not diminish.
The first "official" study. Age discrimination festered just out of sight of the nation's attention until the early 1960s when, in the heat of the Civil Rights movement, the U.S. Congress focused briefly on the issue. Despite amendments offered by Congressman Dowdy of Texas and Senator Smathers of Florida, age was left out of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, ostensibly because not enough was known about the nature and extent of the problem. Instead, the Department of Labor was instructed to carry out a study of age discrimination and report to Congress its findings by June 30, 1965. 8 The study results were so compelling that Con gress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967.
The Labor Department study examined four major sources of age discrimination. 9 The first type of discrimina tion was that arising from dislike or intolerance of older peo ple. The study did not find this to be serious enough to war rant public concern. There was ample evidence of employers choosing youth over age, but the study concluded that this was the result of preferences for the younger group, rather than antagonism against the old.
The second form of age discrimination was termed " ar bitrary*' by the Labor Department's analysts, and it involved specific employer policies which excluded people over a cer tain age for consideration in hiring, without concern for the individual applicant's qualifications. The study found "substantial evidence" of this second type of discrimination. For example, a 1965 survey of employers disclosed that, "approximately half of all job openings which develop in the private economy each year are closed to applicants over 55 years of age, and a quarter of them are closed to applicants over 45." 10 Forces of circumstance caused by the impersonal factors, such as technological change or lower educational levels, constituted the third form of discrimination examined in the Labor Department study. Here the study concluded that there may or may not be arbitrary discrimination. The lower educational level of the cohort of older workers is a factor that could result in discrimination against most older workers. But, only when such discrimination results from not assessing the individual's educational level and other qualifications for the job would it be considered arbitrary and thereby within the purview of Congressional action, ac cording to the Labor Department study.
The fourth and final cause of age discrimination was con sidered to be the set of institutional arrangements that in directly restrict employment of older workers. Employee benefits, seniority rules and personnel policies are included in this group. Here the Labor Department study concluded that age discrimination exists and offered specific ways to overcome it.
The recommendations by the Labor Department included statutory changes to address the arbitrary forms of discrimination, and public and educational efforts to reduce the more subtle forms of discrimination. The result was the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which included measures to penalize offending employers as well as instructions to the federal enforcement agency (then the Department of Labor, now the Equal Employment Op portunity Commission) to provide technical assistance to employers and information to the public to break down the myths about older workers.'' (For a summary of the ADEA, as Amended, see Appendix I.)
Age Discrimination as a Legal Problem
With enactment of the ADEA, the problem of age discrimination moved into clear public view as formal charges were filed by aggrieved individuals and eventual litigation ensued. As yet, there have been few systematic analyses of the characteristics of age discrimination victims who file charges or of the court cases brought under the ADEA. Recent data made available to the House Committee on Aging, however, offer valuable insights into the extent of age discrimination in employment.
Growth in age discrimination charges. According to data provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis sion (EEOC) and the Department of Labor, the number of age discrimination charges has skyrocketed in recent years. (See Figure 1. ) In 1969, two years after the ADEA was enacted, the Labor Department, then charged with enforce ment responsibilities, reported 1,031 charges of age discrimination. This number grew through 1975 then leveled off until 1978, at which time the enforcement duties were transferred to the EEOC. 12 The most dramatic increase in age charges came between 1979 and 1981 when the annual number of age discrimination charges rose by 76 percent to 9,479.
This profound increase in age charges may be the result of intensified discriminatory activity by employers sparked by downturns in the economy, but no studies are available to document this. The transfer of enforcement to the EEOC also may have drawn some attention to the ADEA, and thereby increased the number of Americans who are aware of their rights under the Act. Again, however, no studies have been conducted to verify or refute this notion.
One likely explanation for the increased number of age charges may have been the Amendments to the ADEA, championed by Congressman Claude Pepper, chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging, and enacted with great public fanfare in 1978. The 1978 Amendments were widely debated and publicized, largely because they were to alter the institution of retirement, moving the permissible mandatory retirement age upward to 70 from 65. The public discussion of mandatory retirement issues served to increase the nation's awareness of age discrimination as a problem, while at the same time heightening older workers' knowledge of their rights under the ADEA. Even so, only two in five Americans are even aware of the ADEA, according to a 1981 nationwide Harris survey. 13 Unless age discrimination is significantly reduced, we will, no doubt, see a further rise in age discrimination charges as awareness of the federal age discrimination statute increases in the future.
Who files a charge of age discrimination? Only since late 1980 has the EEOC begun codifying characteristics of charg ing parties and making the data computer accessible. Data for FY 1981 provide a glimpse, albeit preliminary, into the typical person who files a charge of age discrimination with the federal enforcement agency.
As Table 1 indicates, the typical charging party is in late middle age and is male. Two-thirds of all age charges are fil ed by persons age 50-64 (nearly half are age 50-59) and 63 percent are filed by males. Only a small fraction (5 percent) of charges are filed by those over 65. Thus, age discrimina tion may affect a wide age band, but legal and administrative remedies are sought primarily by middle-aged males. 'Total is less than 9,479 (the actual total for FY 1981) because of missing data on the sex of the charging party.
A 46 state survey of 550 alleged age discrimination victims conducted by the House Select Committee on Aging found in 1982 that 43 percent of respondents believed that super visors and managers (especially middle-managers) were most frequently the targets of age discrimination. 14 Non-union workers were also perceived to be targets.
What kinds of charges are typical?
The most common basis for filing an age discrimination charge is "forced ter mination." (See table 2.) Nearly half of all charges filed with the EEOC in FY 1981 involved alleged discrimination in discharge, layoff or involuntary retirement. Hiring discrimination, which is much more difficult to substantiate, was the basis for only 12 percent of all charges. The least fre quent charges were for discrimination in training, demo tions, and promotions. The types of charges vary according to the age of the charging party. For example, hiring and training discrimina tion are more typical among the younger ages, presumably because it is the youngest of the protected individuals who have greater expectations in those areas. Oil the other hand, older individuals were most likely to allege discrimination in employee benefits, perhaps because benefits packages are more salient and more important to the oldest workers, and, at the same time, are perceived to be more expensive by some employers. Males and females exhibit similar patterns of charges, except that males are more likely to file a charge.
Age discrimination charges by industry. Charges of age discrimination are leveled by employees in every industry, but some industries produce more victims that others. Table  3 displays both the absolute and relative numbers of charges by industry. Public administration has the highest frequen cy, with 432 charges per 100,000 employees. Second is transportation, followed by mining and manufacturing. Those least likely to file age discrimination charges are employed in the construction industry (55 per 100,000), ser vices (188 per 100,000) and retail trade (199 per 100,000).
One plausible explanation for these patterns of age discrimination charges is the growth (or lack thereof) of the industry in question. Public administration, transportation, mining, and manufacturing, each of which had a large number of age discrimination charges, all are facing major contractions caused by a sluggish economy and a shift in the demand for these goods and services. Moreover, these are declining industries which tend to employ a larger propor tion of older workers than do expanding or stable industries. Services and retail trade, both expanding industries, ex perienced fewer age discrimination charges, in part because they employ larger numbers of younger workers who are not in the protected age category. Also, termination from a job in an expanding industry does not necessarily mean the end of one's working life as it might in a declining industry. This may also account for the smaller number of age discrimina tion charges in the expanding industries. Construction, the least affected by age discrimination charges, may be unique in that it offers no job security to speak of and fluctuates so wildly in terms of its demand for labor that members of that profession have low expectations of job security.
Which charges reach the stage of litigation?
There is no reliable source of information regarding litigation activity under the ADEA because only a fraction of all litigation is initiated by the Government15 and decisions in private lawsuits are not always recorded. Some ADEA litigation, however, is recorded in LEXIS, a computerized information system, which provided the basis of a recent content analysis by Michael Schuster. 16 The results of Schuster's analysis indicate that lawsuits brought under the ADEA closely parallel the charges filed with the EEOC, as described above. For example, the vast majority of litigants were males (79 percent); nearly half were age 50-59 (48 percent); most were drawn from profes sional and managerial occupations (52 percent); and the manufacturing industry produced the most lawsuits (48 per cent), while the construction industry produced the fewest (2 percent). Termination of employment was the most common basis for litigation (81 percent). It is interesting to note that employers won two out of three cases. 17
Again, the evidence suggests that the ADEA offers legal remedies that are typically utilized by middle-aged, managerial level males who have been terminated from their jobs, allegedly because of age. While provisions of the Act such as those pertaining to the permissible mandatory retirement age directly benefit older individuals of both sexes from a wide variety of occupations, the legal and ad ministrative recourse is most often sought by a narrow group of younger males.
II. The Nature of Age Discrimination
The above analysis of age discrimination charges and litigation activity gives a numerical perspective on the prob lem but offers very little insight into the complex set of fac tors which come under the rubric of age discrimination. This section puts a face on the numbers and describes in more detail how age discrimination is justified and how it is prac ticed.
The Most Obvious Age Discrimination: Mandatory Retirement
The most clear-cut form of age discrimination is that which the Labor Department termed "arbitrary" in the 1965 study cited earlier. According to a more recent Labor Department study, 51 percent of the nation's workforce fac ed an arbitrary mandatory retirement age in 1980, usually age 70, while 45 percent faced no mandatory retirement age. 18 Mandatory retirement rules are subsiding, but they persist for a variety of reasons.
The most common arguments used by employers to justify a mandatory retirement age have not changed substantially over the years despite evidence refuting most of the stereotypes of aging. 19 The most common negative beliefs about older workers which are used to justify compulsory retirement involve personal characteristics associated with aging. 20 Many employers perceive older workers as a group to be ill-suited for certain jobs because of declining mental and physical capacity, an inability to learn, a lack of creativi ty, and inflexibility. 21 Vast amounts of research on the abilities of older workers, however, consistently refute these employer-held stereotypes. For example, studies of in dustrial workers, 22 supervisory personnel, 23 and skilled and unskilled clerical workers,24 disclosed that age was unrelated to performance appraisal ratings, efficiency and overall pro-173 ductivity. Some studies show partial declines on some pro duction line tasks among the oldest age groups, 25 but other studies show slight increases in productivity with age. 26 Similarly, learning ability does not decline significantly with advancing age and any decline which does appear is often more related to motivation and physiological condition than to learning capacity. 27
Employers continue to utilize mandatory retirement because of outmoded notions that age is equated with declin ing abilities. As performance assessment technology im proves and more research findings are generated that destroy the negative stereotypes of aging, we are likely to see a reduc tion in rigid personnel policies that base important decisions on age rather than actual performance.
A favorite argument in support of mandatory retirement is that it provides order and predictability to the retirement decision, and it makes the retirement decision impersonal, thereby relieving the older worker of the burden of being told he or she is no longer productive. When older workers are asked their opinions about this matter they offer a very different story. Take, for example, Sarah Paz, a 69 year old school clerk in Chicago who was within several months of the school district's mandatory retirement age when she testified before the House Select Committee on Aging re garding her feelings about the impersonal nature of man datory retirement ages:
The principals I have worked with through the years have marked me as being a superior clerk; I have always put my whole being into my job. . . . As for being sick or tardy I have the best atten dance record of any staff member in the school, and this has been true for 27 years. I have been tar dy perhaps once a year and have accumulated 135 unused sick days in the past 27 years. When it has been 60 below zero I have arrived at school on time or ahead of time. . . . Who wants the pittance of Social Security when one is able to contribute to society and the working force. . . . Inaction has killed more people than action. Don't commit us to the death house while we are active and alive. 28
Mandatory retirement ages are rapidly dying out. Many large corporations (such as ALCOA, ARCO, Levi Strauss & Co., Mattel, Inc., Pepsico, Inc., Digital Equipment Co.) have already eliminated mandatory retirement, as have eight states (California, Florida, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont). The federal government is likely to outlaw the practice in the near future. (See Section III.) When mandatory retirement is finally abolished it will be an important step toward the eventual elimination of all other forms of age discrimination in employment.
Subtle Discrimination: Job Harassment
Mandatory retirement may, in the words of Rep. Claude Pepper, ". . . engender dependency, foster ill-health and squander productive potential," 29 but other more subtle forms of age discrimination can create greater havoc for older workers. Subtle discrimination can take a variety of forms, as summarized (albeit, somewhat tongue-in-cheek) by Michael Korda in a book entitled Power: How to Get It, How to Use It.
. . . the best way to speed an executive's retirement is to keep him involved in power decisions which no longer concern him, and can only cause him trouble and aggravation. . . . Other, more subtle, signs can indicate to a man that his time has come. Pro moting his secretary is a move that never fails to in dicate the erosion of power. It is also possible to produce anxiety by rapidly changing all forms and 175 procedures of the office, so that everything looks unfamiliar to him, including the labels and let terhead . . . and when all else fails, it is always possible to change everybody's telephone extension number so that he's always dialing the wrong one.
Exaggerated deference and extreme rudeness can both be useful in making a man think about retir ing, and it is also possible to make him feel uncom fortable by constantly referring to pop music stars he has never heard of, dances he has never learned and restaurants he has never been to. ... It is possible to talk in a very low voice in an effort to make him believe he is going deaf, though some prefer to shout in a loud voice as if they were already convinced of the victim's deafness. 30 The most effective techniques of subtle discrimination are those that demoralize the victim by reducing his or her selfimage. Nonmanagement, blue-collar employees are repeatedly reminded, for example, that their age is an im pediment, that they aren't what they used to be and that they are overpaid. In the words of one victim:
... my supervisors displayed animosity and made derogatory remarks about older employees by stating that they are over the hill, do not earn their pay, and that they take too much time in doing the job. 31
Older executives are victimized by stripping them of their real sources of power. Very few executives are willing to become figureheads. "It's crazy, but a lot of quite smart guys would rather be kicked out than kicked upstairs," notes Michael Korda. 32 Sometimes more drastic measures are taken to embarrass the executive into retirement. A promi nent age discrimination attorney testified before the House Select Committee on Aging that the desk of one of his clients was moved into the hallway by his client's employer as an at tempt to humiliate his client and encourage a "voluntary" retirement. 33 Enforcing the ADEA against these subtle forms of age discrimination is, of course, very difficult. Many victims of such tactics are unaware of their plight. Most victims, as noted earlier, are middle-aged males who never dreamed they would be targets of discrimination. Those who are aware have great difficulty producing evidence substantial enough to convince a judge or a jury that age discrimination was the motive underlying their employer's actions. It is like ly that employers will become increasingly sophisticated in these subtle tactics as the more blatant forms of discrimina tion disappear because of the prospects of high litigation costs.
Early Retirement Incentives: The Newest Discrimination
During periods of economic downturn employers seek ways of reducing the size of their workforces using tech niques that will not result in undesirable litigation. A favorite technique for eliminating older workers is the early retirement incentive.
Early retirement options are blossoming during the reces sion of the 1980s. There are no reliable statistics on the number of firms using such options, but business consultants agree that they have "never seen as many early retirement windows open as in the last 12 months." 34 A recent survey conducted by the House Select Committee on Aging and the Public Broadcasting System's "Nightly Business Report" disclosed that many larger companies such as Crown Zellerbach, Uniroyal, Continental, Firestone, Metropolitan Life, Mead, Sears, Xerox, Eastman Kodak, Travelers In surance, Continental Group, IBM, A&P, and American 177 Can have recently implemented early retirement options to entice older workers out of the workforce.
Most early retirement plans are not, on their face, discriminatory. Most offer a substantial bonus to employees who retire early, usually at age 55 with a specified number of service years. Most employers offer these benefits as a humane alternative to layoffs. But there are instances of discrimination which can creep into these early retirement plans.
A recent U.S. District Court decision, for example, found that the Chrysler Corporation's early retirement plan was discriminatory because, in the opinion of the court, the workers were coerced into accepting the company's offer under threat of layoff. 35 Sometimes the discrimination is more subtle, as when an employer misrepresents or exag gerates the long term economic benefits of an early retire ment option, thus encouraging workers to retire when with better information they may have chosen to remain on the job.
Hiring Discrimination
One of the most important sources of age discrimination is the practice by employers of refusing to hire a person because of his or her age. This is also one of the most dif ficult forms of discrimination to document, which may ac count for the relatively small number of such charges filed with the EEOC. (See above.) Hiring discrimination as expressed in age biased job an nouncements once was a greater problem than it is today. This is largely due to very stringent guidelines promulgated by the EEOC which place limits on the terms that can be used in job listings. Terms such as "age 25 to 35," "young," "college student," "recent college graduate," "boy," "girl," or similar terms or phrases are considered to be violations of the ADEA. 36
Hiring discrimination is also fostered by job applications on which the applicant's age or date of birth is requested. The official position of the EEOC on this matter is that such requests do not automatically constitute a violation of the Act, but they will be scrutinized very carefully to assure that the request is for a permissible purpose. Employers can usually protect themselves if they include on the application a statement that reads: "The Age Discrimination in Employ ment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age with respect to individuals who are at least 40 but less than 70 years of age." 37 A consequence of hiring discrimination is the longer period of time older workers require to find a job compared to younger workers. On average, in 1982, an unemployed worker age 55 and over will remain jobless for 19 weeks, which is 23 percent longer than the 15.5 weeks average for all age groups. 38 Also, many older workers become discouraged and give up the job search. Workers 60 and over are three times as likely as all other adults (over 25) to give up and withdraw from the workforce. 39
Long term unemployment and discouragement are a direct result, though not exclusively so, of age discrimination. An unemployed machinist, age 56, summed it up best in testimony before a hearing of the House Aging Committee when he said:
During the time the rumors were flying around about the Torrington plant closing I wasn't too concerned. I am a skilled machinist and the feeling among most of the skilled workers in the plant was that we would have no problems finding jobs if we were laid off. I figured it might take a few weeks to find another job. It never dawned on me that my age might be a problem in the job search.
I'm too young to retire, but apparently some employers think I'm too old to work. All of the younger machinists I know have jobs, but a number of us older guys are still unemployed 6 months after we lost our last job. 40 From the employers' point of view, older workers are sometimes considered to be less desirable because they have fewer work years remaining and, especially if training is in volved, the employer is concerned about recouping his in vestment. Many older skilled workers, however, require little or no training and their lower rates of turnover often make them more dependable employees than younger workers. Similarly, employer concerns about higher benefit costs associated with older workers are realistic, but in many cases these may be offset by the more efficient work habits, lower turnover and lower absenteeism of older workers.
Salary Discrimination
One of the most complex forms of age discrimination in volves salary or wages. It is generally held by the public that older workers are discriminated against because they are too costly and younger workers can replace them for much less money. Supporting this position are numerous stories about older workers who are discharged just a few days before they would have achieved vested rights in their pension, thereby saving the employer thousands of dollars in pension payments. Or, there are examples of older workers who are allegedly discharged and replaced by two younger workers for the same total salary. Certainly these stories are true and illustrate an important source of age discrimination. There is, however, another salary pattern which suggests a quite different view of age discrimination: salary deceleration.
Salary deceleration, in the form of smaller or fewer salary increments, often occurs among older workers. The former vice president of personnel and organization development for Abraham & Strauss, the largest division of the Federated Department Store conglomerate, described the process of salary deceleration at a Congressional hearing:
Then there is the deceleration process and the phenomenon of "pattern" increases. In salary management, salary increases are frequently decelerated for job holders who are at or above the top of the established salary range for a given job.
This process of deceleration is designated to relieve relative inequities, like where the subor dinate is making more than the supervisor. . . . Unfortunately, this salary management tech nique has been subverted. In the case of Sam . . . because he was 62 he received an increase of $1,500 every other year, far below the official guidelines of around 7 percent annually for his level of performance. But then the idea is that as age in creases, job mobility decreases, and this factor is an invitation to decelerate, crop and deny increases simply because the employee has lost job mobility. The employee can't or won't leave. This is especially true of older women, because they tend to have less self-confidence and ex perience in the job market and fewer possibilities in the job market due, in turn, to the traditional and historical roles of women in our society and because of sex discrimination. 41
In contrast to the stories of older workers being replaced by less expensive younger workers, the process of salary deceleration described above suggests that it is the younger workers who may be more expensive. Certainly at the ex-ecutive level this is often true. For example, testimony before the Select Committee on Aging by a former executive using confidential salary and age data on "key executives" of the Abraham & Strauss Department Store chain illustrate this point. Executives under 40 had average salaries in 1976 that were nearly $10,000 higher than executives over 40; by 1979 the discrepancy was nearly $30,000. (See Figure 2. ) Thus, it was the younger executives who were more expensive than the older ones. Apparently, the company considered younger executives to be more valuable than the older executives.
Salary discrimination, then, hits older workers in two very different ways. In some cases salaries rise "too high" and the employer replaces the older individual with less expensive younger workers. In contrast, other employers suppress the salary increases for older workers and inflate those of younger less experienced workers, presumably because older workers have less job mobility while younger workers are perceived to be more valuable. The net result is the same: older workers are discriminated against.
Freezing Pension Contributions: Legalized Discrimination
One of the most controversial provisions of the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA permits employers to stop con tributing to a worker's pension plan at age 65. 42 Despite evidence that such a policy has no cost justification,43 nearly half of all employers nationwide freeze pension benefits at age 65. 44 The net result is that many older workers choose to retire by age 65 rather than suffer the loss of benefit accruals associated with a later retirement age.
From a national policy perspective, allowing discontin uance of pension accrual is irrational. To the extent that such a policy discourages continued employment among older workers, 45 it runs counter to the overriding concern of Con- gress which is to reduce the costs of retirement programs. Encouraging longer worklives should be the goal of public policy in the face of dramatic demographic trends which por tend heavier and heavier financial burdens on young workers to care for the expanding retiree population. Nevertheless, the policy of discouraging employment among the old per sists and will not be changed unless Congress specifically mandates it.
III. Recent Efforts to Modify the ADEA
The 97th Congress will be best remembered for its budget cutting activities, its dearth of social legislation and a reluc tance to make major modifications in the troubled Social Security system. Buried deep in the dust of that Congress, however, are the remnants of a stillborn attempt to end once and for all the last vestiges of age discrimination in American society. This legislative effort to build on the 1978 ADEA Amendments, although thwarted by a variety of cir cumstances, reflects a growing awareness by national policymakers that age is a poor indicator of job ability; that the older members of society should be unshackled and allowed, even encouraged, to remain productive as long as possible. The following review of legislation to end age discrimination during the 97th Congress and of attempts by the business community to weaken the current act is not only an interesting lesson in American politics, but also reflects the competing interests, misplaced priorities and dashed hopes of the various actors involved in the debate over ex tending fundamental civil rights to America's older citizens.
Legislation to Amend the ADEA
Early in the 97th Congress, Rep. Claude Pepper introduc ed legislation (H.R. 3397) that would, among other things, amend the ADEA by removing the upper age limit of 70 and by closing various loopholes which allowed age discrimina tion against older members of select occupations. This legislation received a boost when President Reagan announc ed on April 2, 1982 that he would, ". . . back legislation which eliminates mandatory retirement requirements in government and private industry based solely on age." 46 The President's announcement unleashed a flurry of activity in Congress.
Congressional negotiations. The Labor Department, designated by the Reagan Administration, initiated negotia tions with key members of Congress to work out the details of a bill to abolish mandatory retirement and other remain ing forms of age discrimination. At the outset there was wide disagreement in Congress about what issues should be in cluded in legislation, but one issue was clear: the best means to end mandatory retirement was simply to remove the upper age limit of 70 from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Other issues such as requiring equitable pen sion treatment for workers over 65, eliminating discrimina tion against executives and removal of other loopholes in the ADEA were discussed but eventually set aside by their pro ponents in exchange for commitments for swift enactment of a bill that would end age discrimination for workers age 70 and over.
Business and labor reactions. Immediately following the President's April 2 statement, major business and labor organizations indicated that they had no problem with the elimination of mandatory retirement. According to an April 13 Wall Street Journal article, "Few business groups oppose the bill, and the AFL-CIO says it would 'go along with it.' " 47 Within weeks, however, the major business groups began to reconsider their initial position on this issue and, at the urging of a small group of employers represented by a Washington law firm, they began to raise concerns about several of the protections offered by the ADEA. By early Compromise position worked out. A compromise was worked out between the Administration and House Aging Committee Chairman Claude Pepper. The terms of the com promise were that Pepper and other key House and Senate leaders would go along with the Administration's revised position in exchange for direct White House involvement in opposing any amendments (such as those being proposed by the business groups) to weaken the ADEA. Since support for the weakening amendments appeared to be stronger in the Republican controlled Senate, the strategy was to allow the Senate to act first on the legislation, thereby leaving the Democratic controlled House with the option of killing the bill if it contained any harmful or weakening amendments. Unfortunately, the Senate never acted.
Academics mobilize against the bill. One important reason for the Senate's failure to act on the bill was a late lobbying effort by college and university presidents and faculty. Representatives of both groups pressed for a special provi sion in the bill that would exempt tenured faculty. The argu ment was that eliminating mandatory retirement for tenured faculty would threaten the tenure system and weaken the in stitution of higher education. This lobbying campaign was successful in muddying the waters and effectively stalling any legislative action on the bill during the regular session of the 97th Congress.
Business Objections to ADEA Enforcement Procedures
Some members of the business community have suggested that the right to a jury trial should be eliminated because older plaintiffs allegedly prevail more frequently injury than judge trials in age discrimination cases. The argument is that because of the responsiveness of juries to emotional appeals, plaintiffs receive inflated damage awards from juries that are far higher than they would normally receive from a judge.
The right to a jury trial. The right to a jury trial was established by the Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) . The court was convinced that Congress had intended to include the right to a jury in the ADEA, since the ADEA was patterned after the Fair Labor Standards Act, which allowed jury trials. The 1978 Amendments to the ADEA reaffirmed congressional support for jury trials in ADEA actions.
No evidence that juries are biased toward older workers.
Although no scientific data exist on jury trials and the ADEA, two surveys of personal injury cases (with are more emotional than ADEA cases) have produced conflicting results as to whether older plaintiffs prevail more frequently. In a 1974 study of personal injury cases based on 800 ver dicts, the Jury Verdicts Research Company found the recovery rate was 59 percent for plaintiffs who are retired or are over 65, compared to a national average of 65 percent. A 1982 study of personal injury cases found the prevailing recovery rate for retired plaintiffs was 65 percent, which was above the national rate of 52 percent. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that there is no clearcut evidence of bias in favor of older plaintiffs in jury trials. In general, no documented evidence has indicated that older plaintiffs prevail more frequently with juries than with judges under the ADEA.
Damage awards under the ADEA. In addition to the jury trial provisions, business lobbyists also want to eliminate the liquidated damage provisions of the ADEA. The claim is that liquidated damages are punitive and therefore have no place in antidiscrimination legislation. The remedies available under the ADEA, however, are the same as remedies available under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Section 7(b) of the ADEA incorporates the powers, remedies and procedures provided in sections of the FLSA. The FLSA provides that employers who violate its provisions shall be liable for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, and an equal amount of liquidated damages for willful violations. However, in order to show a willful violation of the ADEA, the litigant must establish a "knowing and voluntary violation of the Act."
The narrow interests of some business lobbyists and of the academic institutions have effectively stalled efforts to im prove legal protections for workers based on age. We may be in the midst of a political climate in which business leaders are concentrating their efforts on reducing the effectiveness of federal legislation rather than attempting to comply with intent of the legislation. The result, if this new climate con tinues, may be counterproductive to the broader social goal of equal employment opportunities for all age groups.
Conclusion
Public and employer opinions reveal a widespread belief that age discrimination is real. And, the recent upsurge in legal and administrative confrontations between older employees and their employers indicates that substantial numbers of older persons are acting on their beliefs.
The problem of age discrimination is not, however, con fined to the oldest age groups (65 + ). Certainly, age discrimination increases by age, but for a variety of reasons the oldest workers are not the ones seeking retribution. Rather, the typical age discrimination victim pursuing legal and administrative remedies is middle-aged, male and often from a managerial position. These individuals represent a new group of civil rights activists. They are not poor, minorities or women. They are predominantly white, middle-class individuals who have the resources to pursue an age charge and who believe they deserve better than they are getting after a lifetime of dedication to their employer.
The forms of age discrimination range from the more ob vious mandatory retirement ages, to more subtle job harass ment and early retirement incentives. Each of these forms represents not only a threat to the well-being of older in dividuals, but also undermines the economic stability of the nation. Age discrimination reduces the work efforts of older people, encourages premature labor force withdrawal, and increases the burden on an already burdened Social Security system and on private pension systems. Without adequate solutions to the problems of age discrimination and without incentives to encourage more older workers to remain employed longer, the nation could be facing a serious economic and social crisis.
Ironically, recent legislative attempts to bolster the Age Discrimination in Employment Act have been thwarted by special interest groups. In particular, business lobbyists have pushed to weaken the protections afforded by the ADEA, at a time when, if anything, the statute needs strengthening. Unfortunately, business is seeking ways of reducing costs during times of recession, an objective that is threatened in the view of some business leaders by civil rights legislation in general. Just as we should not tolerate weakening the Civil Rights Act, so we must also resist any attempt to undermine the ADEA. Rather, public policy efforts should strengthen protections for older workers, not only in the interests of in dividual rights but as a means of contributing to the nation's economic welfare.
Appendix I Basic Protections of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA prohibits employers, employment agencies or labor organizations from discriminating on the basis of age in such matters as hiring, job retention, compensation and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment. The Act prohibits employment-related advertisements that show preference, limitation or discrimination based on age. And, labor organizations may not classify or refer persons based on their age.
In the 1978 Amendments, mandatory retirement was specifically oulawed for most federal workers at any age and for private sector and state and local employment before age 70. Furthermore, the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA specifically prevent employee benefit plans such as retire ment, pension or insurance plans from including man datory retirement provisions for protected workers.
Exemptions
The 1978 Amendments contained several important ex emptions. First, executives and policymakers are protected only to age 65, if the individual has been employed in a "bona fide executive or a high policymaking position" for at least two years and is entitled to an annual retirement benefit provided by the employer of at least $27,000. Such high-level executives and policymakers can, therefore, be mandatorily retired upon their 65th birthday.
A second exemption applies to employee benefits. The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments left room for a subsequent Labor Department interpretive bulletin allowing employers to reduce certain employee benefits for workers age 65 and over. For example, pension contributions can be 191 reduced or discontinued when an employee reaches age 65. Life insurance benefits may also be reduced if the employer can demonstrate that such benefits are more expensive for workers over age 65 than for those under 65. Employers were allowed to reduce health benefits until a 1982 Amendment required that workers between the ages of 65 and 69 be of fered full coverage by the employer's health plan. Health benefits can be reduced and/or offset by Medicare after age 69.
Last, certain federal occupations were excluded from the Act air traffic controllers, airline pilots, federal law en forcement officers, prison guards and firefighters, employees of the Alaska Railroad, Panama Canal Company, Canal Zone Government, Foreign Service and Central In telligence Agency. These occupations are covered by provi sions in separate statutes.
Procedural Issues
Several significant procedural changes were added to the ADEA in 1978, largely because of concern that the courts were dismissing lawsuits on procedural grounds, without consideration for the merits of the complaints.
Before going to court, an aggrieved individual must first file a "charge alleging unlawful discrimination" with the federal enforcement agency within 180 days of its occurrence (or 300 days if the alleged violation occurred in a state which has an agency empowered to grant or seek relief from age discrimination). After 60 days from the date of filing, or after conciliation efforts by the appropriate enforcement agency have failed, the charging party may file a private suit.
The statute of limitations two years for nonwillful viola tions and three years for willful violations may be tolled (extended) for up to one year, to allow the federal agency more flexibility to attempt conciliation. The tolling provision 192 was added to the ADEA in 1978 to prevent those employers who may have violated the law from delaying conciliation with the idea of avoiding back pay liabilities because of the statute of limitations.
One of the most important procedural amendments of 1978 was that providing for a jury trial option. A jury trial is available to individuals in cases when alleged discrimination involves potential monetary liabilities, usually in the form of back pay.
Enforcement of the Act
Until 1979, the Department of Labor had jurisdiction over all aspects of the ADEA. With "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978" the responsibility for ADEA enforcement shifted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Enforcement responsibility by the EEOC for the federal sector became effective on January 1, 1979, and for private sector and state and local government employment it became effective on July 1, 1979.
NOTES

